I know in these tough times of contemplation, ‘to support the bill… to support it not,’ some of us start to feel emotionally drained. The constant debate, ‘No we don’t want to compromise… but we need to pass something,’ makes many of us feel like we are betraying our ideals.

It is these times when we need to remember our collective strength, success, and know that no matter what happens we are on the side of right. Check out this great piece on Power Shift ‘09  and take a moment to bask in the memory of what we did, the optimism we instilled, and the potential that exists and is begging to be released.

(Film by Michael Zeligs)

Posted in global warming

Originally posted at the Breakthrough Institute

Advocates of the Waxman-Markey American Clean Energy and Security Act (H.R. 2454, or “ACES” for short) argue that the bill is far more than just a climate bill. It’s a comprehensive piece of clean energy, efficiency and climate legislation, and taken as a whole, they argue, it should be considered transformational — even if the cap and trade portion of the bill may have been significantly weakened (see Breakthrough’s detailed analysis of the ACES cap and trade program here).

The ACES bill does indeed include many many provisions to set a new course for our nation’s energy policy, including efficiency standards and regulations, authorization for new programs aimed at modernizing the nation’s electricity infrastructure and paving the way for plug-in hybrid and electric vehicles, and a national renewable electricity standard. Many of these will move America in the right direction.

But the question remains: will ACES really be transformational? And will it propel American quickly away from business as usual and towards the prosperous clean energy economy and dramatic emissions reductions we need?

Breakthrough’s team has taken a close look at the bill’s cap and trade provision, and discovered that the combination of offset provisions and a little-known provision called the “strategic reserve pool” could allow U.S. emissions to greatly exceed the supposed emissions “cap” set by the legislation.

Here we examine one of the other major provisions of the ACES bill, the national renewable electricity standard (RES) established by Title I of the bill. Unfortunately, our analysis concludes that the RES has been severely weakened since initially proposed in the discussion draft version of the ACES bill; as it now stands, the RES may barely increase U.S. renewable electricity generation compared to business as usual projections.

The discussion draft version of ACES, originally circulated on March 31st, contained a renewable electricity standard with a nominal target of 25% of U.S. electricity generation from qualifying renewable sources by 2025.

I say nominal target, because several exemptions and specifications mean the 25% standard does not apply to all U.S. electricity generation. An April 2009 U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) analysis of the originally 25% by 2025 standard concluded that it would really only require 21% of U.S. electricity generation from renewable sources in 2025, after excluding the small utilities exempted from the requirement (any utility that provides less than 1 billion kWh of electricity sales in a given year) and after excluding electricity served by existing hydropower (as the bill specifies).

Furthermore, the original standard allowed a governor of any state to petition the federal government to reduce the renewable electricity requirement for utilities serving their state by 1/5th (to 20% by 2025) if they instead require utilities to achieve 5% energy efficiency savings as a substitute. If this provision were fully utilized, the renewable electricity requirement could have fallen to 16.8% of total U.S. electricity sales in 2025.

That’s where things stood at the end of March. But as the ACES bill moved through backroom negotiations and the Energy and Commerce (E&C) Committee markup process, the renewable electricity standard was severely weakened.

As passed by the E&C Committee, ACES (H.R. 2454) replaces the 25% by 2025 renewable electricity requirement with a combined 20% renewable electricity (RE) and energy efficiency (EE) requirement by 2020 (continuing each year thereafter).

Again, this 20% target is nominal though, and after exempting small utilities and hydropower again, it really applies to just 16.8% of total U.S. electricity sales in 2020. (Actually the exemption is worse than that, since the threshold at which small utilities are exempted was expanded to exempt utilities selling less than 4 billion kWh of electricity each year vs 1 billion kWh in the discussion draft. I am unable to calculate the effect of this expanded small utility exemption however, and continue to rely on the EIA analysis as the basis of my calculations, which factors in the lower 1 billion kWh exemption figure. In short: this is a slightly optimistic analysis when it comes to exemptions.)

Since this is a combined RE and EE standard, up to one quarter of the requirement (i.e. 5 percentage points in 2020) can be met with certified energy efficiency savings instead of renewable electricity generation. This means the renewable electricity requirement is really just 15% by 2020 nominally, and applies to just 12.6% of U.S. electricity sales in 2020 after exemptions.

Furthermore, like the discussion draft version, the new standard allows governors to petition to allow further energy efficiency savings to be substituted for the renewable electricity requirements. If utilized, the renewable electricity requirement would be cut back to 12% by 2020 with an 8% energy efficiency requirement. After again excluding exemptions, the renewable electricity requirement would apply to as little as 10.1% of U.S. electricity generation in that scenario.

The following table summarizes and compares the nominal and real targets of the ACES discussion draft version and the H.R. 2454 version as passed by the House E&E Committee (click to enlarge)…

It is also worth noting that the cost containment provision in the renewable electricity standard have also been weakened/lowered (yes, like all cap and trade regulations, renewable electricity requirements always contain some form of cost containment). The provision, known as an “alternative compliance payment”, allows utilities to pay a per megawatt-hour (MWh) fee instead of providing proof of qualifying renewable electricity generation. The alternative compliance payment was cut in half from $50 per MWh in the discussion draft version to $25 per MWh in the new version. That means that if complying with the standard is more expensive than simply generating dirty or non-qualifying electricity and paying the $25 per MWh (2.5 cents per kilowatt-hour) alternative compliance payment, utilities will choose to generate less renewable electricity than the supposedly required by the standard.

We’ve updated the April EIA analysis of the discussion draft version of the ACES renewable electricity standard to reflect all of the above changes and calculate the effects of the standard now contained in H.R. 2454. We also compare these results with EIA’s business as usual estimates of qualifying renewable electricity generation (recently updated to reflect the impacts of the recession and stimulus) to estimate the real impact of the new ACES renewable electricity requirements. As with all of our ACES analysis, all our calculations and assumptions are available for download as a spreadsheet (.xlsx) here, and our results are shown in the graphics below.

We conclude that as it now stands, business as usual renewable electricity generation may exceed the renewable electricity requirement if the discretionary efficiency waivers are fully utilized, and will boost qualifying renewable electricity generation to just 2 percentage points higher than business as usual in 2025 if the efficiency waivers aren’t utilized at all. In short, the ACES RES will have between little to no impact on renewable electricity generation through 2025 (little impact in a normal scenario and no impact in the worst-case scenario permitted by the legislation; note that this doesn’t even factor in the potential use of alternative compliance payments to further reduce renewable electricity requirements…) See graphics below (and click any to enlarge)…

We also compared the amount of qualifying renewable electricity required by the two version of the renewable electricity standards, and conclude that the H.R. 2454 version of the renewable electricity requirement, as passed by the E&C Committee, is 14% weaker than the originally proposed discussion draft standard in 2020 and 40% weaker in 2025, as illustrated in the graphics below…

It’s no wonder neither the American Wind Energy Association or VoteSolar are particularly exuberant about the passage of the ACES bill through the Energy and Commerce Committee.

Here’s AWEA’s remarks on the renewable electricity standard:

The bill passed by the Committee includes an RES of 20% by 2020, permitting states to allow up to 8% of the standard to be met through energy efficiency improvements. AWEA has indicated that while it hails the recognition of the importance of a national RES, such a low level – less than one-half the level originally proposed by President Obama and in Chairman Markey’s original discussion draft — could severely blunt the signal to the private sector to invest billions of dollars and expand production, manufacturing, and job creation.

And here’s VoteSolar:

Nearly any policy action that encourages more renewable energy is A-OK with us. … However, as currently written, none of the pending RES policies will deploy significant amounts of solar. According to the Department of Energy’s analysis of that 25 percent RES by 2025, which again is much stronger than the compromise goals emerging from Committees, the federal RES structure could lead to a 35 percent increase in solar compared to a 678 percent increase in wind. When you’re starting at 0.001 percent, 35 percent growth doesn’t amount to much.

Posted in Climate Challenge, Climate Policy, Government, Power Shift, Renewable Energy, United States

The United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) was established in 1992 to ensure effective follow-up to the Earth Summit by reviewing progress in the implementation of Agenda 21, Rio, Johannesburg, etc. To meet this mandate, the CSD convenes on an annual basis in 2-year thematic cycles, the first year to gather data, case studies, and related info, and the second year to draft policy that will guide development solutions that address these thematic challenges. This year, May 4th-15th, was the 17th session of the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD-17); a policy year addressing the themes of Agriculture, Rural Development, Desertification, Land Use, and Africa.

This was my fourth time participating in a CSD conference, and each time I notice this – it is extremely difficult to discuss sustainability, a concept defined most fundamentally by interrelationships, within a framework that compartmentalizes its issues into thematic clusters (ie. agriculture, rural development, . . . climate change, energy . . . water, human settlements, etc.). Certainly each of these themes warrants its own debates, research, and policy recommendations. It is also true that each CSD conference has an “interlinkages” working group with an objective to address the interrelationships between the themes being discussed. My point, however, is that there are interrelationships between themes of previous years, and years ahead even, that should not be left out of the conversations simply to conform to the organizational structure of the Commission. I bring this up not to complain, but to set the stage for the purpose of this blog – to highlight the important relationships between Agriculture and Climate Change that were overlooked at CSD-17.

First, I will give credit where credit is due. The final text culminating from two weeks of negotiations does not overlook climate change entirely. The text acknowledges, “Agriculture is also dependent on climate and sensitive to climate change. Sustainable agriculture practices, as well as sustainable forest management can contribute to meeting climate change concerns.” The text also calls on member states to “Support training and capacity building of rural communities to effectively implement adaptation programmes to climate change at the local level.” Beyond these references, however, there is little more mention in the 54pg document of what I would consider the elephant in the room. Below I summarize a few of the major connections between Agriculture and Climate Change that I have adapted from a publication by Third World Network titled “Enduring Farms: Climate Change, Smallhoders, and Traditional Farming Communities.”

First, it is important to understand the centrality of agriculture in sustainable development. Agriculture consumes nearly 40 percent of global land surface and consumes 70 percent of global water resources. At every point of production, agriculture is heavily influenced by ecosystems, biodiversity, climate, and the economy. Modern agriculture today is a fossil-fuel-energy-intensive industry that causes a positive feedback loop fueling further climate change, less productive agriculture, and consequently less food security. For example, “World agriculture and forestry practices (e.g. conversion of wetland to agriculture, deforestation, rice paddies, cattle feedlots, fertilizer use) today contribute about 25 percent to the emissions of greenhouse gases, while reducing carbon sinks and changing hydrological cycles, thus exacerbating climate change effects. In turn, the increasing frequency of storms, drought and flooding has implications on the viability of agro-ecosystems and food security.” It is important to note that the impacts of climate change on agriculture are already being felt by many communities, primarily in the Southern hemisphere.

Apart from the landless and urban poor, small farmers are among the most disadvantaged and vulnerable groups in the developing world. Most climate change models show that these small farmers will bear a disproportionate brunt of climate change damages. Where subsistence agriculture is the norm, a mere 1-ton yield decrease (primarily maize, beans, potatoes, rice, etc.) could lead to major disruption of rural life. These risks are especially great in the drylands of Africa where yields from rain-fed agriculture could be reduced by 50 percent by 2020.

Another potentially significant impact of climate change on agriculture is the loss of soil organic matter due to soil warming. High temperatures are likely to speed the natural decomposition of organic matter and other soil processes that affect fertility. In drylands where desertification is a major problem, root growth and decomposition are suppressed, consequently diminishing soil cover and increasing soil erosion from intensified winds. In other areas, soil erosion will come from an expected increase in convective rainfall due to more atmospheric moisture and stronger gradients of temperature and pressure.

Climate change is also exacerbating agricultural challenges associated with pests and plant disease. Warmer climates enable some insect pest species to complete a greater number of reproductive cycles during the summer, winter, and fall. During the winter, warmer climates allow larvae to “winter-over”, causing greater infestation during the following crop season. There is limited literature that analyzes the impact of climate change on plant diseases and pathogens. What does exist indicates that the most likely impacts will be felt in three areas: losses from plant diseases, the efficacy of disease management strategies, and the geographical distribution of plant diseases. Although the ultimate impacts are still unclear, it is widely determined that increased temperatures and humidity will increase the severity of many pathogens. The challenge is to make sure that the agrochemical industry does not exploit increased pest and disease infestations as a profiteering opportunity disguised as altruism (as had been the case of GMOs and “golden rice“).

A discussion about the impacts of climate change on agriculture would not be complete without addressing biofuels. Biofuels was perhaps the most contentious topic at CSD-17. There is tremendous pressure, also cloaked in clean energy altruism, to ramp up the rate of biofuel production. Unless this agenda is carried out with utmost attention to equity and long-term environmental sustainability, it will likely be disastrous and perpetuate an already violent and inequitable ideology whereby the Western world assumes entitlement to global commons like water and other ecosystem services. Expected increase of biofuel monoculture production will lead to increased rates of biodiversity loss and genetic erosion. A possible compromise may lie in prioritizing third-generations biofuel crops over first and second generation. Finding a fair biofuel solution is a significant topic that cannot be adequately addressed here. The main point is that arable land must be used to strengthen food security in the Global South as opposed to fueling (pardon the pun) excessive consumption behaviors in the western world.

As you can see there are inextricable connections between climate change and agriculture that need to be addressed specifically. We cannot “wait until Copenhagen” to tackle climate change as was suggested by one delegate at CSD-17. The related trends and challenges above should have been brought to the table during CSD-16, the data gathering year of this thematic cycle. This would have positioned CSD-17 to more effectively develop specific policy recommendations that allow agriculture to not only adapt to climate change, but mitigate. Agriculture and forestry can be part of the solution through carbon conservation, sequestration, and substitution, and establishing ecologically designed agricultural systems that can provide a buffer against extreme weather. Other solutions include permaculture practices, water harvesting, infiltration pits, drought-tolerant crops, multiple cropping and polyculture systems, wild plant harvesting, agroforestry and mulching, use of local genetic diversity, and soil organic matter enhancement. As the TWN document concludes, “The diversity of these systems, and the creativity and knowledge of family farmers and indigenous communities are assets of great value for solving the daunting problems affecting agriculture in the 21st century.”

Posted in agriculture, Climate and Forestry, global warming, UN Commission for Sustainable Development

On April 17th, 2009, the Obama EPA announced that it was proposing to find carbon dioxide (and five other heat trapping gases) a danger to human health.  While this might seem self-evident to us, this is big news for the federal government because this is the first step in the process of EPA regulation.  In 2007 we celebrated the Mass vs. EPA decision when the Supreme Court ruled that global warming pollution poses a danger to human health and must therefore be regulated under the Clean Air Act.  Under the Bush Administration we saw no action taken on this ruling.  But now, Obama has instructed Administrator Jackson and the EPA to move forward with the process of regulating carbon dioxide and other global warming causing pollutants.  Regulation is likely not the single silver bullet and must be used in combination with other policies such as investment.  Many consider this ruling a pressuring tactic to aid floundering climate legislation in Congress.  This ruling could also provide the foundation for a negotiating position at December’s UN Copenhagen climate talks.

From April 17th — June 23rd, the EPA is encouraging public comment.  They held two hearings for this purpose in Arlington, VA and Seattle WA on May 18th and 21st respectively.  I had the privilege of attending the Seattle hearing and rally, organized by a coalition of groups including the Sierra Student Coalition and Cascade Climate Network.   EPA reported that response to both hearings was “overwhelming.”

More than 2,000 people turned out in Seattle to support the EPA’s decision at the noon rally on the 21st.  Hundreds of children and students joined members of the faith, business, and environmental communities.  David Nokovic, freshman at Portland State University, spoke at the rally on behalf of the youth in attendance.   “We pledge to end this climate crisis within our lifetimes, because failing to do so is unconscionable,” said Nokovic.  “We pledge to hold ourselves and our elected officials accountable, and we pledge to work with all who will join us.”

All through the day, nearly 200 people testified and over 90% of that testimony was in favor of global warming pollutant regulation.  Over 25 youth gave compelling testimony to the panel of EPA representatives who heard 10 hours of testimony that day.  I myself, was on a panel with two industry lobbyists from the Washington Farm Bureau and two other youth…

The Washington Farm Bureau representatives claimed that the science wasn’t in yet and that they were disappointed that the EPA was not abiding by expert scientific advice.  While one advocate agreed that the affects of climate were wrecking havoc on the state’s agriculture, he pointed to solar flares as the reason, as evidenced by this beautiful sunny day he said.  Instead of investing in regulation, he preferred the federal government invest in large water storage facilities so that in times of drought (caused by solar flares I suppose) farmers (aka big Ag) could still irrigate their crops.

The WA Farm Bureau testimony was strictly contradicted by the next two youth testifiers.  Nick Engelfried, a graduating senior of Pacific University raised the issue of equity and green jobs, which our generation could desperately use.

For all these jobs to materialize we need a federal government that will not only invest in green energy technologies, but which will clamp down on the old polluting industries — coal, oil, gas, and industrial agriculture — which have so long held the workers of America captive under the old, inefficient, fossil fuel-dependent economy that we are now seeing crumble all around us…  If the EPA is up to that challenge, you can count on our support every step of the way.

Mark Kimbrell of Focus the Nation also testified in this same panel:

This administration and this agency have a generation of young people behind them.  But make no mistake, if the legislation and regulation we deserve is weakened by compromise with the status quo of the past, this movement’s commitment will only become stronger.  And there is nothing stronger than thousands of young people who feel their future is being gambled away!

Public comment is being accepted until June 23rd!  Follow these instructions to get yours in, it’s easy!  There are many groups congratulating the EPA on this decision, but the EPA really needs to hear from forward-thinking folks who have thoughtful comments about how to regulate these pollutants.  It’s not enough to regulate global warming pollution, we must do it in a just manner that takes this problem and turns it into an opportunity, particularly for those of low socioeconomic status.

Posted in Cascade Region, Climate Policy, Coal Campaign, Government, Political Participation, Politics, Power Shift, United States, Youth Leaders

The Waxman-Markey American Clean Energy & Security Act (ACES) contains a provision that could allow U.S. global warming pollution to exceed the supposed emissions “cap” by 10 percent — and “make up” for these additional emissions by purchasing several billion more tons of carbon offsets.

Every climate bill, in the U.S. and abroad, contains provisions limiting how high carbon prices established by the policy can rise. The Waxman-Markey American Clean Energy and Security Act (ACES) is no different. As the Breakthrough Institute previously reported, ACES would allow polluters to purchase up to 2 billion tons per year of relatively cheap carbon “offsets,” which could allow emissions in supposedly “capped” U.S. sectors to rise by up to 9% between 2005 and 2030. The EPA predicts that, largely due to the extensive use of offsets, carbon prices will remain less than $20 per ton of CO2 for the next decade.

Many proponents of ACES have argued that U.S. polluters will not utilize the 2 billion tons of authorized carbon offsets each year. The supply of credible offsets is limited, they say, and demand will eventually push their price above the cost of most alternative emission reduction strategies. (For now, let’s put aside the fact that those same price pressures — and the industries and sectors that stand to profit from selling more offsets — will also be a powerful force for establishing weaker offset certification standards.)

However, even in the case where affordable offsets are unavailable, and emission allowance prices rise, ACES contains an additional cost containment provision that could allow U.S. global warming pollution to exceed the supposed emissions “cap” — and “make up” for these additional emissions by purchasing several billion more tons of carbon offsets.

If allowance prices rise too much in any given year, this provision, known as the “strategic allowance reserve pool,” would allow polluters to delay their emission reductions by purchasing emission allowances from the reserve pool, which would then be “refilled” over time with additional international forestry offsets. Based on our analysis, this provision could allow U.S. emissions to rise 10% above the “cap” in any year after 2016 and introduce up to 9.3 billion additional offset allowances between 2012-2050.

Therein lies a Catch-22 of ACES: if the annual use of up to 2 billion tons of offsets permitted by the bill is limited due to a restricted supply of affordable offsets, the government will pick up the slack by selling reserve allowances, and “refill” the reserve pool with international forestry offset allowances later. Here’s how it would work (defined in section 726 of the bill).

The strategic allowance reserve would be established by taking a certain percentage of allowances originally reserved for the future — 1% of 2012-2019 allowances, 2% of 2020-2029 allowances, and 3% of 2030-2050 allowances — for a total size of 2.7 billion allowances. Every year throughout the cap and trade program, a certain portion of this reserve account would be available for purchase by polluters as a “safety valve” in case the price of emission allowances rises too high.

How much of the reserve account would be available for purchase, and for what price? The bill defines the reserve auction limit as 5 percent of total emissions allowances allocated for any given year between 2012-2016, and 10 percent thereafter, for a total of 12 billion cumulative allowances. For example, the bill specifies that 5.38 billion allowances are to be allocated in 2017 for “capped” sectors of the economy, which means 538 million reserve allowances could be auctioned in that year (10% of 5.38 billion). In other words, the emissions “cap” could be raised by 10% in any year after 2016.

As for the price, the reserve allowance auction price would have a floor of twice the EPA price estimate for the average allowance in 2012, rising by 5% plus inflation in 2013 and 2014. Afterward, the price floor would be 1.6 times the average allowance price for the previous three years. The reserve allowances not purchased each year would be put back in the reserve account.  EPA predicts an initial allowance price of just $12-20 per ton in 2015, which would set the initial strategic reserve safety valve price at as low as $24 per ton. According to EPA, allowance prices will remain below $20 per ton until after 2020, meaning the safety valve price that triggers the reserve auction could ensure pollution allowance prices stay below $32 per ton for the first decade or more of the cap and trade program ($24*1.6=$32).

The public proceeds from the reserve auction each year would go toward purchasing international offsets from reduced deforestation. These offsets would be converted back into emission allowances and placed in the strategic reserve account (at a 5 offsets to 4 allowances conversion ratio after 2017, as with other international offsets). Interestingly, the legislation specifies that if the reserve account is filled to its original size, any additional allowances from international offsets would be allocated and auctioned as part of the normal allowance auction in a future year, adding even more offsets into the mix.

This first graph represents the impact the strategic allowance reserve could have on emissions in capped U.S. sectors during any year between 2012-2050. It also shows the additional impact on capped sectors if up to 2 billion tons of offset provisions were used in any given year (we aren’t predicting this will occur, but showing the real maximum extent of emissions the bill authorizes, in contrast to the “hard emissions cap” it supposedly establishes).  BAU is based on a projection by the World Resources Institute:

This second graph represents the impact the strategic allowance reserve could have on total, economy-wide U.S. emissions during any year between 2012-2050. It also shows the additional impact on U.S. emissions if 1.5 billion tons of foreign offsets potentially permitted by the bill are used in any given year:

Finally, these two graphs show the impact of the strategic reserve and full offsets on total U.S. emissions in 2020 and 2030 compared to other levels:

Since there is no limit on how many foreign offsets could be purchased and used to replenish the strategic reserve — and since the original size of the allowance reserve is 9.3 billion less than the total number of allowances authorized for reserve auction (12 billion minus 2.7 billion) — this provision could introduce up to 9.3 billion offset allowances to the cap and trade system, in addition to the 2 billion in annual offsets already authorized by the bill. At an average price of $15 per allowance, this would add up to $139 billion in international forest offsets.  (Click here to download full spreadsheet analysis.)

In order for these offsets not to be utilized — and for the emissions “cap” not to exist in name only — two things must hold true. First, international offsets must be more expensive than emissions reduction opportunities in capped domestic sectors, and second, the cost of these domestic reduction opportunities must not trigger the widespread purchase of the reserve allowances. Otherwise, either private investors or the government will purchase large quantities of international offsets and the total allowable emissions in the supposedly “capped” sectors will be permitted to exceed the emissions “cap.”

Whether or not this potentially high demand level for foreign offsets — and the trading mechanisms inherent to the cap and trade system — is comparable to the conditions that produced the global financial crisis, is up for debate (Friends of the Earth, at least, is worried). The financial crisis was caused by many factors, but a critical one was the massive global “savings glut” that resulted in extraordinary levels of demand for mortgage-related assets in the US. In this environment, there was little incentive to stop the sale of subprime mortgages.

The design of Waxman-Markey may create a set of conditions around carbon offsets all too similar to the conditions leading up to the financial crisis: an extraordinary level of demand, and very little incentive to stop the production and sale of “subprime” offsets.  Remember, as conditions stand now, a well-known Stanford University study on international offsets concluded: “between a third and two thirds of emission offsets under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) — set up under the Kyoto treaty to encourage emissions reductions in developing nations — do not represent actual emission cuts.”

If ACES is established and the U.S. suddenly enters the international offsets markets with an appetite for billions of tons each year, the pressures and motivations at play are arguably stacked in favor of weakened — not stronger — standards of integrity for carbon offsets. If and when carbon prices rise, the pressure will be on to mitigate price impacts on consumers, industry and the U.S. economy. At the same time, potential offset providers will see a new multi-billion dollar opportunity to expand their supply of offsets through weaker standards. Standing against these powerful interests will be the environmental community, fighting to convince policymakers to put longer-term environmental interests ahead of short-term energy price pressures and political backlash. Who do we think elected officials will listen to in that scenario?

And finally, what happened to the “hard cap” and “emissions reduction certainty” that cap and trade advocates have long promised?

Posted in Carbon Trading, Climate Policy, Corruption, Deforestation, Economics, Government, Politics